Pleasure follows from desire, and desire can be shaped. Rightly ordered desires when attained bring rightly ordered pleasure. This is why in the collects of the Mass the Church is constantly asking Our Lord to grow in our souls right desire. With right desire we find pleasure in the good, pleasure in the things of God. Pleasure and disgust can be our servants in helping us go to God if our desires are rightly ordered. When not rightly ordered, when perverse, we find pleasure in corrupt things and are ultimately lead to death. For example, porn ought to evoke disgust and shame, not pleasure. It only evokes pleasure to those whose desires are in some way, perverse, which most of us are on account of sin and the horrors of our modern times. Our Lord's grace can work in the soul to repair that corruption and produce right desires which lead to pleasure at the good and disgust at the perverse.
Surely we need something more precise than “that which gives pleasure when one beholds it". Porn is pretty pleasurable, but is it beautiful? The idea of harmonious order is much better. I think we can make it even simpler and say that beauty is form (organization, structure, logic). This captures every aesthetic experience -- art, music, poetry, math -- while excluding things that simply feel good. Whatever beauty is, it isn't a feeling.
"That which gives pleasure when one beholds it" is oversimplified and incomplete, as condensed, dictionary-style definitions tend to be. However, I think it's more informative and complete than it initially appears. To use your example, I'm pretty sure that many people don't find pornography pleasurable or beautiful; they find it disgusting and perhaps horrifying (even when it involves people who would, in more wholesome circumstances, be admired for their physical beauty). The definition is one of those philosophical generalizations that requires a more absolute interpretation, i.e., "beauty is that which _should always_ give pleasure when one beholds it." There are many things that give pleasure (perhaps base and disordered pleasure) when beheld by some and not others; these are not so much beautiful as (potentially) pleasing. But I've never heard of a person who feels disgust when beholding a sunset, or a rose, or a starry night sky, or an elegant golden chalice, or a graceful folk dance. These things are beautiful.
In any case, you're certainly correct that beauty isn't a feeling, but we also don't want to lose sight of the fact that form and harmonious order do _evoke_ feeling—namely, pleasure—when human beings behold them.
This is tough. Is there any work of art that is universally pleasing? In fact, is there anything in the whole world that always invokes the same response in everyone?
I would say no. In fact, many great pieces of art are unpalatable to the average person. This is why I keep returning to the form definition. Something can be beautiful and hated at the same time, and our model needs to account for that.
I don't believe that "universally pleasing" implies that everyone must experience the same response. Think of how people can view the same image and notice different aspects of the scene.
First, I agree with the perspective that you expressed in your previous comment: we cannot expect phenomena such as beauty to be as uniform and straightforward as the theories that surround them. That's part of why topics like this are so rich and continue to provide us with thought-provoking discussions twenty-four hundred years after Plato pondered them. Second, I think Ms. Sorenson has an important point, namely that "universally pleasing" doesn't imply the "same pleasurable response." Pleasure is a capacious sensation; a work of art, whether created by God or human beings, can be pleasing to different people in different ways. I agree with your focus on form when we're investigating aesthetics, but I think our understanding will be more complete if we suggest that a truly beautiful object will produce _some kind of pleasure_ in virtually every human being who beholds it. I qualify with "virtually" here to account for those who have severe physical or spiritual impairments—these cases would then be exceptions that "prove" the rule ("prove" in the archaic sense of "test," thereby helping us to understand the rule's true nature).
I just keep thinking of people like Webern, Xenakis, and Nancarrow. Their music is beautiful because it is perfectly formed. However, 95% of people will say that it "sounds bad" (whatever that means) and immediately discount it.
What about something like math? Most people *hate* math, but this doesn't make one of Euclid's proofs any less aesthetic.
I don't think there's any place for feelings in art.
Pleasure follows from desire, and desire can be shaped. Rightly ordered desires when attained bring rightly ordered pleasure. This is why in the collects of the Mass the Church is constantly asking Our Lord to grow in our souls right desire. With right desire we find pleasure in the good, pleasure in the things of God. Pleasure and disgust can be our servants in helping us go to God if our desires are rightly ordered. When not rightly ordered, when perverse, we find pleasure in corrupt things and are ultimately lead to death. For example, porn ought to evoke disgust and shame, not pleasure. It only evokes pleasure to those whose desires are in some way, perverse, which most of us are on account of sin and the horrors of our modern times. Our Lord's grace can work in the soul to repair that corruption and produce right desires which lead to pleasure at the good and disgust at the perverse.
These are well-articulated thoughts, Mr. Harrison, thank you for joining the discussion.
Lovely.
Surely we need something more precise than “that which gives pleasure when one beholds it". Porn is pretty pleasurable, but is it beautiful? The idea of harmonious order is much better. I think we can make it even simpler and say that beauty is form (organization, structure, logic). This captures every aesthetic experience -- art, music, poetry, math -- while excluding things that simply feel good. Whatever beauty is, it isn't a feeling.
"That which gives pleasure when one beholds it" is oversimplified and incomplete, as condensed, dictionary-style definitions tend to be. However, I think it's more informative and complete than it initially appears. To use your example, I'm pretty sure that many people don't find pornography pleasurable or beautiful; they find it disgusting and perhaps horrifying (even when it involves people who would, in more wholesome circumstances, be admired for their physical beauty). The definition is one of those philosophical generalizations that requires a more absolute interpretation, i.e., "beauty is that which _should always_ give pleasure when one beholds it." There are many things that give pleasure (perhaps base and disordered pleasure) when beheld by some and not others; these are not so much beautiful as (potentially) pleasing. But I've never heard of a person who feels disgust when beholding a sunset, or a rose, or a starry night sky, or an elegant golden chalice, or a graceful folk dance. These things are beautiful.
In any case, you're certainly correct that beauty isn't a feeling, but we also don't want to lose sight of the fact that form and harmonious order do _evoke_ feeling—namely, pleasure—when human beings behold them.
This is tough. Is there any work of art that is universally pleasing? In fact, is there anything in the whole world that always invokes the same response in everyone?
I would say no. In fact, many great pieces of art are unpalatable to the average person. This is why I keep returning to the form definition. Something can be beautiful and hated at the same time, and our model needs to account for that.
I don't believe that "universally pleasing" implies that everyone must experience the same response. Think of how people can view the same image and notice different aspects of the scene.
Doesn't the phrase "universally pleasing" mean that everyone experiences the same pleasurable response?
First, I agree with the perspective that you expressed in your previous comment: we cannot expect phenomena such as beauty to be as uniform and straightforward as the theories that surround them. That's part of why topics like this are so rich and continue to provide us with thought-provoking discussions twenty-four hundred years after Plato pondered them. Second, I think Ms. Sorenson has an important point, namely that "universally pleasing" doesn't imply the "same pleasurable response." Pleasure is a capacious sensation; a work of art, whether created by God or human beings, can be pleasing to different people in different ways. I agree with your focus on form when we're investigating aesthetics, but I think our understanding will be more complete if we suggest that a truly beautiful object will produce _some kind of pleasure_ in virtually every human being who beholds it. I qualify with "virtually" here to account for those who have severe physical or spiritual impairments—these cases would then be exceptions that "prove" the rule ("prove" in the archaic sense of "test," thereby helping us to understand the rule's true nature).
I just keep thinking of people like Webern, Xenakis, and Nancarrow. Their music is beautiful because it is perfectly formed. However, 95% of people will say that it "sounds bad" (whatever that means) and immediately discount it.
What about something like math? Most people *hate* math, but this doesn't make one of Euclid's proofs any less aesthetic.
I don't think there's any place for feelings in art.